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Democracy in Africa: A
Very Short History
W^HEN DISCUSSING GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, ONE MUST BE
circumspect when applying the term "democracy" (but see Sklar
1987). One reason for doing so is because the term is imprecise. As in
the vmtings of Schumpeter (1950), "democracy" can refer to political
competition and, in particular, open competition among rival political
parties. Others, such as Dahl (1971), argue that to be democratic, such
competition must take place vdthin a setting infused with attendant
rights and freedoms—the right to association, for example, or to free
speech—and such rights must be equally shared. Still others, such as
Huntington (1991) or Przeworski, Alvarez et al. (2000), would insist that
even were a polity to exhibit these attributes, it could not be labeled
democratic until one party had surrendered power to another upon
losing a national election. While differing in the attributes they posit
and the qualifications they impose, those who v^n-ite of democracy join
in emphasizing its essential property: that it is a form of government in
which political power is employed to serve the interests of the public
rather than of those who govern.
In this essay I argue that democracy, in this sense, has been
reborn in Africa. The evidence, I argue, strongly suggests that its renais-
sance has been accompanied by changes in public policies and political
practices that generate benefit for the people. But the evidence also
suggests that political dangers remain: incumbent parties strive to
suborn the electoral process and incumbent executives seek to prolong
I wish to thank Befekadu Degefe for his comments and criticisms of earlier versions
of this paper.
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Africa's citizens must "remain vigilant." Paraphrasing John Adams at
the U.S. constitutional convention, Africa today may enjoy better gover-
nance, but "can [she] keep it?"
INDIGENOUS ROOTS
Without seeking to romanticize the past, we can note the democratic
tendencies that infused precolonial societies in Africa. In his extraor-
dinary series on the political history of precolonial Central Africa, for
example, Jan Vansina emphasizes the radical republicanism of the
lineage systems of govemment and the efforts they expended to elude
domination by centralized states (Vansina 1966,1978,1990,1999,2005).
Even v\dthin centralized kingdoms, others stress, there existed promi-
nent fora vdthin which citizens could challenge the royals and their
bureaucrats.^ In some, the office ofthe prime minister was reserved to
the commoners. In others, commoner councils provided a check on the
public administration. In still others, societies—some secret, others,
like the asafo, fully public—organized a defense for commoner inter-
ests. FoUovwng a study ofthe precolonial political systems, one author
concludes:
The evidence suggests that, while there was inequality
in the states of pre-colonial Africa, those who held posi-
tions of privilege had to assure that the benefits created by
states were widely shared. For the bargaining power ofthe
masses, relative to the elites, was strong... (Bates 1987:42).
FOREIGN OCCUPATION
When in the nineteenth century imperial powers occupied the conti-
nent, they imposed local rulers on societies that had long resisted poht-
ical authority. When they encountered societies that possessed chiefs,
they either displaced these rulers and imposed rulers of their OWTI or
forged opportunistic alliances with incumbent chiefs. As many have
noted, chiefs and headmen found room to maneuver in the contested
space between the occupier and their people; when they did so,
1134 social researchhowever, it was often in pursuit of their own agendas (Gluckman 1955).
The chiefs were able to exploit their political position to acquire—and
sell—land; to extract—and divert—tax revenues; and to promote the
fortunes of their kin within the new political order. They were able to
evade many ofthe restraints that previously had limited their powers,
for to oppose them was to risk provoking the wrath of the colonial
occupier.
Follovwng the global conflicts ofthe twentieth century, the Soviet
Union and United States moved to the center ofthe global stage. While
the two great powers clashed ideologically and politically, they shared
a disdain for Europe's political prétentions. And when local political
forces rallied in resistance to colonial occupation, the great powers
let Europe's empires collapse and new nations rise from the political
rubble.
POLITICAL TRANSITION
A notable feature ofthe nationalist movements was the degree to which
they targeted the chiefs. Few who did so opposed the institution ofthe
chieftaincy per se; traditional political institutions still evoked respect
even among the educated elite, and not only because a disproportion
of its members came from chiefly families. Where the chiefs were
attacked, it was because they occupied the firont ranks of the colonial
order and because they had employed public office to secure private
advantages. In this sense, the nationalist movements drew upon and
renewed the democratic impulses that lay embedded in local pohtical
institutions.
Ironically, in this period the imperial powers also began to
promote the forces of democratization. Following World War II, they
were no longer able to dominate the course of events outside of their
European base and so sought to forge ways of shaping outcomes that
they no longer could control. Whereas in the past, they could pick and
impose local political leaders—that is, the chiefs—they now had to be
satisfied with merely shaping the manner in which such leaders were
chosen. Out of political necessify, they therefore began to introduce
representative institutions. They permitted prominent locals to take
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they permitted local citizens to choose who among them were to do so.
The culmination of the process was "self-government": the assumption
of full executive and legislative power by local politicians.
The administrative, coercive, and judicial arms of the colonial
state exercised close oversight of this transition. These bodies treated
local pohtical organizations as subversive^ and monitored the actions of
pohtical activists, regulated the holding of meetings, and censored the
content of local publications. The imperial powers introduced democ-
racy as a means of disengaging from an enemy they could not defeat.
The introduction of democratic institutions was thus the by-product of
a search for an advantageous way of negotiating the terms of a pohtical
surrender.
The colonial governments may have been forced to introduce
electoral competition and representative institutions; but the appara-
tus they employed to shape these institutions was not one that sought
to guarantee democratic rights and freedoms. Rather, it was one that
sought to safeguard and protect the institutions that had secured
foreign domination over the people of Africa (Young 1994).
INDEPENDENCE
It can come as no surprise, then, that the forces that took over the
colonial state, while celebrating self-government and the end of impe-
rial rule, failed to endorse open political competition and the atten-
dant rights of political expression and public assembly. Symptomatic
is the fate of opposition parties in the period immediately following
political independence. Twenty-six sub-Saharan countries in Africa had
gained independence by the late 1960s: the territories of the former
French West and Equatorial Africa, British West and East Africa, and
the Central African states of Malawi, Zambia, and Congo. "By 1960, the
year in which most of... Africa became independent," Ruth Collier
writes, "nine countries had (formed) one-party regimes" (Colher 1982:
95). By the mid-1970s, seven more govemments imposed single-party
mle. In the first wave of consohdation—much of which occurred prior
to independence and during the period of self-government—the fold-
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negotiation, with opposition parties "crossing the fioor" and merging
with the government. In the second wave, which occurred after inde-
pendence, political consolidation tended to be involuntary: it was the
product of rigged elections, the jailing of political opponents, and the
outlawing of political parties. Then, Collier notes, came a wave of coups
and the formation of mihtary regimes. Following the coups of the early
1960s, the military had handed power back to civilians. Subsequently,
however, it chose to remain in office. And by the mid-1990s, authoritar-
ian regimes had "become a dominant feature of African political life"
(1982: 96). (See figures 1 and 2 online^ for depictions of the distribution
of political regimes in post-independent Africa.)
POLICIES
In the postindependence period, governments sought to mobilize polit-
ical power to promote economic development. As eloquently captured
by Ndulu (2008), in part they did so because economic doctrines
prescribed interventionist policies. Whether to break out of "poverty
traps," to induce "backward and forward linkages," or to launch a "big
push" toward economic development, economic theory advocated
that governments invest in industries and intervene in markets so as
to transform the structure of their economies. As Ndulu (2008) argues,
political sentiment reinforced economic doctrines. By investing in
firms that could produce at home what formerly had been imported
from abroad, they sought to lessen their economic dependence on
their former colonial masters. The power of the Soviet Union and
the Chinese Communist Party's ability to expel the imperial powers
provided further inspiration to those who sought to use the state to
promote development.
Rather than letting market forces determine prices in the macro-
economy, many governments in Africa strove to regulate both the inter-
est and exchange rates, keeping them artificially low: capital equipment
could then be imported more cheaply. By imposing tariffs and licensing
imports, governments sought to limit competition from abroad; and
by licensing firms and restricting entry, they attempted to suppress
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development, not only did governments thus seek to strengthen the
incentives for private investment: they themselves also invested in the
formation of firms or nationalized firms that had proven slow to invest.
Governments also intervened in the rural sector. By expelling
private agents from agricultural markets, they gained the power to
influence prices and employed that power to lower the price of farm
products. In export markets, they purchased goods at low domestic
prices and then sold them at prices prevailing in global markets, pock-
eting the difference in the form of public revenues. In food markets,
they used their market power to lower the prices charged urban
consumers, be they firms purchasing raw materials, such as cotton, or
urban dwellers purchasing staple foods, such as maize. In their study of
the political economy of Africa's development in the postindependence
period, the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) labels this
mix of policies a "control regime" (Ndulu, O'Connell et al. 2008), a term
I shall adopt for this essay.
As recognized by Schattschneider (1965), public policies bear
testimony to the stmcture of power in a society; in his words, they insti-
tutionalize "patterns of bias." In postindependence Africa, the domi-
nant political structure included the political elite, which chose public
policies; a rapidly expanding public sector, charged with their imple-
mentation; and a nascent industrial sector, which was the intended
beneficiary. The rural sector remained massive in size, generating over
half the national income and employing three-quarters or more of the
labor force, but it was excluded, economically and politically, from
the new order. Those who had seized power and implemented control
regimes mounted what amounted to a war of attrition against their rural
populations. Note the incidence ofthe costs and benefits: appreciating
the currency may have lowered the costs of importing capital equip-
ment, but it also lowered the earnings of agricultural exporters and the
price of food imported from abroad. Limiting imports of manufactured
goods from abroad may have promoted the profitability of domestic
firms; but it also enabled them to raise the prices they charged consum-
ers, most of whom were farmers. And while intervention in agricul-
1138 social researchtural markets enabled govemments to tax foreign earnings and contain
pressures for higher prices for consumer staples, it lowered farm reve-
nues. Control regimes were thus systematically biased in favor of the
nascent urban sector (Bates 1981; Krueger, Schiffet aL 1992; Anderson
and Masters 2009). (See figure 3 online for a depiction of how, in the
1970s and 1980s, this mix of policies had been adopted by a majority of
Africa's regimes.)
CRACKS IN THE EDIFICE
Control regimes could not be sustained economically. Consider, for
example, the market for foreign exchange. When the local currency
increases in value, the prices of foreign goods fall and the demand for
imports rises. By the same token, the value of exports falls: exporters
receive fewer local "cedi" for each "dollar" they eam abroad. With an
increase in imports and a decline in exports, the country begins to accu-
mulate deficits; to remain solvent, it must borrow. But when Mexico
defaulted in its external obligations, private bankers stopped lending
abroad and called in their loans, and Africa's states could no longer
borrow in order to cover their deficits.
For Africa's citizens, the result was hardship. For lack of foreign
exchange, drugs disappeared from hospitals and textbooks from
schools. Trucks, tractors, and automobiles stood idle, for want of
imported parts. So too factories whose machines had been purchased
abroad. Because mechanical equipment could not be refurbished,
the infrastmcture could not be maintained. The supply of electricity
became even more erratic; roads crumbled, many becoming impass-
able during the rains; locomotives, ferries, and steamships decayed,
rendering transport more expensive and less reliable. All whose quality
of life depended on the quality of this infrastructure suffered as a result
of its decline. In addition, Africa's people suffered from rising prices, as
govemments printed money in an effort to finance their deficits.
In the midst of this decline, Africa's authoritarian polities
remained in place. Indeed, the very interventions that weakened their
economies added, in the short mn at least, to their political power.
Consider once again the market for foreign exchange: as we have
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demand for imports and a decrease in the supply of exports, thus gener-
ating a shortage of foreign exchange at official prices. In black markets,
however, because ofthe excess demand, the price of foreign exchange
rises. Those manning the national bank and finance ministries thus
found themselves in command of a very precious resource. By control-
ling appointments to these bureaucracies, the president could control
its allocation, conferring benefits on friends, denying them to enemies,
and thereby building a loyal band of followers—one willing to defend
him, politically, even while his policies crippled the economy.
By the same measure, however, the members of Aftica's politi-
cal elite sacrificed their political legitimacy. Consider the vista that lay
before Africa's citizens. Their economy lay in tatters, public services
were in disarray, and public infrastructure in disrepair. And yet the
favored few—that is, those in power—drove expensive cars, dressed
in expensive apparel, and sent their family's children to expensive
schools abroad. By laying hold to and manipulating prices in the econ-
omy, their mlers had, on the one hand, converted markets into political
machines. But on the other, they had incited the wrath of their people,
thereby preparing the ground for those who might wish to drive them
from power.
Political criticism mounted not only from within but also
mounted from those who held Africa's debts abroad. At first, foreign
creditors sought changes in government policies. To increase their
leverage, they gathered into blocs, which were organized and main-
tained by the international financial institutions. As coordinators of
Aftica's creditors, these institutions then acquired great influence. At
first, they entered into dialogue with the debtor govemments, point-
ing to alternative ways of securing their policy objectives. Increasingly,
however, they spoke harshly, offering forbearance but in exchange for
the governments' willingness to change their policies. Over time, the
harsher tone prevailed, and Aftica's governments found themselves
facing growing foreign pressure to alter their economic policies.
Subsequently, the staff of the international financial institutions
and, in particular, the staff of the World Bank, began to call not only for
1140 social researchpolicy but also for political reform. In part they did so because of the
puzzle posed by the behavior of Africa's regimes: Why would govem-
ments, they asked, choose policies that violated the economic inter-
ests of its people? They would do so, they reasoned, if their preferences
were not aligned wdth those who owTied and managed the economies
productive resources. From this reasoning emerged the outlines of a
strategy: by rendering a government accountable, they could harness
its pohtical ambitions. Should the citizens be able to dismiss a govern-
ment that had harmed their interests, politicians would then possess
an incentive to choose policies that strengthened rather than under-
mined the economy. In a series of publications (World Bank 1981,
1991a, 1991b, 1994), the managers of Africa's debt advocated political
reform as means of attaining policy reform in Africa.
The clash between Africa's creditors and its governments
appeared one-sided: the creditors were rich and powerful; Africa, poor
and weak. But political as well as economic interests were in play; and
the international agencies were public, not private institutions and
under the control of governments. During the Cold War, Africa had
become a theatre of the Cold War. Armies backed by the Soviet Union on
the one side and the United States on the other clashed on the Horn and
Kenya provided the United States harbor facilities and overfiight rights
in the region. Liberia provided the United States an outpost for track-
ing satellites and a refueling base for its airplanes. And Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of Congo) provided a base for forces, financed by
the United States, that fought movements backed by Cuba, China, and
the Soviet Union. When an arap Moi, a Sergeant Doe, or a Mobutu Sese
Seko came under pressure from the Intemational Monetary Fund or
the World Bank to reform his economic pohcies, the State Department,
the Foreign Office, or the Quai d'Orsay would step in to defend their
political chent. Because they held a majority on the boards of the inter-
national financial institutions. Western govemments were well placed
to temper the reformist zeal of their technocrats. For political reasons,
the economic costs of bad policies were judged worth pajdng.
Those Africans who had scanned the political and economic
terrain about them and been moved to demand pohtical change thus
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by political forces at the global level.
POLITICAL REFORM
Following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989, the resistance that had
originated in the foreign ministries of the West collapsed. Dictators
that had once proved embarrassing but useful were now simply embar-
rassing and were set aside as qmically as they had once been employed.
The result was a msh to reform. As depicted in table 1, the process
began in French speaking West Africa: in Febmary 1990, in Benin, local
reformers set up a national convention, which soon declared itself a
constitutional assembly, thus arrogating to itself the power ofthe state;
the assembly legalized opposition parties and called for open elections
to fill executive positions and legislative offices. Inspired by events in
Benin, reformers in other states then convened similar conventions;
the practice spread through neighboring polities, then inland and
southward, and penetrated into Central Africa. In concert with these
domestic political forces, those in the international financial institu-
tions renewed their push for political reform; this time their efforts
met Uttle resistance from Westem govemments.
Not only did the new international realities loosen the restraints
under which they labored; the collapse of communism strengthened
their hand. For now the international financial institutions could point
to, say, the U.S. Congress and credibly argue that without political
reform, govemments in Aftica stood httle chance when competing for
international aid with states just liberated ftom communism.
Under intense pressure ftom citizens at home and mounting pres-
sures ftom creditors abroad, governments in Aftica rapidly changed
their political institutions. The pace and extent of these reforms is
vividly captured in figures 1 and 2 (available online).
THE AUTHORITARIAN REACTION
When govemments have been authoritarian, they have good reason to
fear political competition and the possible loss of power. Authoritarian
mlers commonly used public power to acquire private wealth, seiz-
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Country
Benin
Congo
Gabon
Mali
Niger
Burkina
Faso
Ghana
Togo
Zaire
CAR
Chad
Date
Feb. 90
Feb. 91
Mar. 90
Jul. 91
Jul. 91
Aug. 91
Aug. 91
Aug. 91
Aug. 91
Oct. 91
Jan. 93
Duration
1 week
3 months
3 weeks
2 weeks
6 weeks
7 months
7 months
1 month
1 year
2 months
3 months
Election
Month
Feb. 91
Mar. 96
Aug. 92
Dec. 93
Apr. 92
Feb. 93
Dec. 92
Dec. 92
Aug. 93
-
Aug. 92
Jun. 96
F&F?
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
-
yes
no
Outcome:
Ousted
7
?
•p
•?
incumbent
Retained
?
r>
•?
•?
•?
ing land, appropriating shares in firms and financial institutions, and
extorting bribes from those they mle. Were they to be deprived of the
defenses available to those in office—command of the pohce, the jails,
and the office of the pubhc prosecutor—they would become vulnerable
to reprisals. As democratic forces mobihzed, then, so too did efforts to
repress them. In Kenya, opposition leaders were jailed and tortured;
police broke up public rallies, on occasion shooting into the crowds;
and prominent critics of the regime perished in mysterious circum-
stances. In Togo, the military government mobihzed its soldiers who,
with bayonets and bullets, cleared the capital's streets of citizens rally-
ing in support of pohtical reform. Mobutu, Mugabe, Habyarimana: each
mobilized their regimes coercive powers in an eftort to suppress those
demanding democracy.
As the incumbent elite became increasingly insecure, other
politicians mobilized their own supporters, the better to defend their
interests in the subsequent scramble for power. Some recruited thugs
from the streets, who could be gathered quickly and quickly set aside;
others assembled militias, which once formed remained under arms.
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and the percentage of countries reportedly harboring armed militias
ftom 1970-1996; figure 5 shows the rise and decline of civil wars ftom
1960 to date.)
The period of reform was thus also a period of political violence.
But there was also a subsequent decline in the frequency of conflict.
Widespread violence, it would appear, was a properfy of the transi-
tional d5aiamics of political reform rather than ofthe new steady state.
The new democracies appear to be no more prone to such conflict than
did their authoritarian predecessors; it was the transition to democracy
that was violent.
In the short term, reform proved costly: it precipitated an author-
itarian reaction and political violence. But in the longer term, in many
states, political order returned; and along with the blessings of peace
came changes in economic policy.
POLICY CHANGE
Recall the incidence of the costs and benefits of control regimes: the
benefits accrued to nascent manufacturing and the rapidly expand-
ing public sector, both based in urban centers, while the costs fell
upon consumers and the producers of agricultural products, most of
whom live in the countryside. Given the nature of Aftica's economies,
however, when politicians must campaign for votes in order to secure
power, they then must compete for the votes of farmers. To win these
votes, they need to champion policies that generate benefits for, rather
than inflict costs upon, rural dwellers. The introduction of competitive
elections thus empowered the mral majorify and the patterns of politi-
cal bias embodied in govemment policies.
Two bits of evidence pertain. The first comes ftom the AERC
study, which argues for an "elective affinify" between authoritarian
politics and the maintenance of control regimes and found that govem-
ments chosen in competitive elections were 20 percentage points less
likely to adopt control regimes (Bates 2008: 196). Of more direct rele-
vance is a World Bank study (Anderson forthcoming) of govemment
1144 social researchpolicies toward agriculture. As an aggregate measure of these poli-
cies, the research team calculated the Relative Rate of Assistance (or
RRA), which compares the degree to which govemment policies enable
producers in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to raise prices
over and above those that would prevail in competitive markets (as
benchmarked by prices in global markets). When govemment policies
exhibit urban bias, then the measure turns negative; positive values
indicate a bias toward farmers. (See figures 6 and 7 online for depic-
tions of the greater degree of urban bias consistently exhibited by
governments in Africa as compared to those in regions in the rest ofthe
world, and the effect of the size of the mral electorate on discrimina-
tion against farming.)
The recent revival of economic grov^h in Africa comes from
several sources: the infusion of capital from South Africa, China, and
migrants living abroad, and the demand for primary products from the
growing economies of Asia surely play the dominant role. Before these
forces impacted upon the economies of Africa, however, the AERC
researchers had noted that the adoption of a control regime, all else
being equal, was associated vnth a nearly 2 percentage point reduction
in the rate of economic groM^h. Given that agriculture is the largest
single industry in most African economies, it is thus possible that the
abandonment of control regimes plays a significant part as well.
CONCLUSION
Political competition between organized political parties provides one
means to render mlers accountable, thereby aligning their interests
with the interests of those they rule. Insofar as private citizens own and
control the productive resources of society, the result should be that
govemments that are accountable will use public power with restraint:
rather than using the power of the state to seize the wealth of those
they mle, they will seek to protect its creation.
Further evidence ofthe relationship between political reform and
the conduct of govemments comes from the work of Humphreys and
Bates (2005). Governments that face political competition in upcoming
Democracy in Africa: A Very Short History 114Selections, they find, are more likely to honor contracts and less likely
to extract bribes. (The results parallel the data contained in figure 8
[available online], which captures the World Bank's summary ofthe
ratings of govemments. For the African sample, authoritarian govern-
ments are rated as more corrupt, less respectful ofthe mle of law, and
less effective than are nonauthoritarian regimes.)''
While we are still far from establishing cause and effect, the
evidence is suggestive: differences in the institutions that govern Africa
appear to go hand in hand wdth differences in the way in which govem-
ments employ their powers. Political reform appears to have elicited
political restraint and a higher quality of governance.
The question is, of course, whether the reformist impulse will
endure or erode. The elections in Nigeria and Kenya in 2007 underscore
the potential for backsliding; so too those in Sudan and Rwanda. Also
indicative are the efforts to revoke the limits on the terms of presi-
dents, as documented in figure 9, available online.
Political liberty is always in peril. As Adams proclaimed to the
citizens of Philadelphia, so he might have exhorted those in modern
Africa: Remain vigilant!
NOTES
1. "You have eaten me": this wistful phrase—variously attributed
to Yomba or Lunda kings, upon assuming office—confirms the
monarch's recognition that he must subordinate his private needs to
the obligation of public service.
2. Indicative is that in the British colonial archives, the files on the
nationalist parties bore the same label (SOC) as did those for armed
insurgencies, nativist rebellions, and communist cells.
3. All figures and the appendix accompanying this article are available
online at <www.socres.org/appendices/774bates.htnil>.
4. For the definition of an authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regime,
see the appendix, available online. Applying a t-test to the difference
between the means, the difference in the ratings in each ofthe four
panels is highly significant.
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